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where the nature of the criminal activity was more serious and/or more central
to the activity involved, where the illegal activity was expressly included in the
contract, or where one of the parties did not know or intend that the activity in
question to be carried out was illegal but the other did, or where the proceedings
arose out of the fact that such a contract had only been partly performed.89
It is not possible to lay down a clear and definitive rule that would cover
the second example and any other future examples. Thus, although Lord
Neuberger said that the application of the Rule would resolve and dispose of
this case, he endorsed Lord Toulson’s range of factors approach because of the
considerable permutations and complexities that have arisen and could continue
to arise from cases involving contractual illegality that are not contemplated by
the Rule.90
CONCLUSION
The minority’s rule-based approach ‘has failed to deliver on what some have
claimed to be its principal virtue viz ease of application and predictability of
outcome.’91 Admittedly, the range of factors approach is not strictly necessary
for the resolution of the specific issue in this case and the disposal of the appeal
(as demonstrated by Lord Neuberger’s Rule and in particular Lord Mance and
Lord Clarke’s reasoning). However, because the law was in ‘disarray’,92 the ma-
jority was correct to have set the record straight by authoritatively pronouncing
on what the correct approach to the illegality defence is. This approach has been
shown to be well-supported by authorities, and, if refinements suggested in this
article were to be made, it is likely to result in significantly less uncertainty than
the minority’s rule-based approach.
A Director’s Duty of Loyalty and the Relevance
of the Company’s Scope of Business: Cheng Wai Tao v
Poon Ka Man Jason
Pearlie Koh∗
The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal has utilised a ‘scope of business’ inquiry to delineate
the boundaries of the no-conflict rule for the company director. Such an inquiry is directed
at discerning the realistic ability of the company to exploit any particular business opportunity
and a strict capacity approach is eschewed, at least where the no-conflict rule is concerned. The
decision is premised on a bifurcation between the no-conflict and no-profit rules, suggesting
89 ibid at [179] per Lord Neuberger.
90 ibid at [180]-[182].
91 ibid at [134] per Lord Kerr.
92 ibid at [164] per Lord Neuberger.
∗Singapore Management University.
C© 2017 The Author. The Modern Law Review C© 2017 The Modern Law Review Limited.
(2017) 80(5) MLR 927–954 941
bs_bs_banner
Published in Modern Law Review, 2017 September, Volume 80, Issue 5, Pages 941-954
http://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12294
A Director’s Duty of Loyalty and the Relevance of the Company’s Scope of Business
that the tests to determine breach of these fiduciary rules are not necessarily the same, thus
permitting a more nuanced consideration of directorial breaches.
INTRODUCTION
It is ‘old hat’1 that the relationship a director has vis-a`-vis his company is
fiduciary in nature. The company is accordingly entitled to the director’s ‘single-
minded loyalty’.2 To ‘encourage’ such loyalty, equity dictates that the director,
in the absence of informed consent by the company, is strictly ‘not entitled
to make a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his
interest and duty conflict’.3 The no-conflict rule embedded in this proscriptive
statement applies not only to an actual conflict, but also to a possibility of
conflict.4 The rule, as stated, is clearly capable of reaching far. This potential is,
however, bridled by the courts’ preference for some perspective to be placed
on the idea of theoretical conflict. It has therefore been repeatedly said that any
possibility of conflict must be ‘real [and] sensible’5 from the viewpoint of the
reasonable man, looking at the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular
case.
But what factors are relevant in testing for conflict? This depends on which
of two camps one is in.What divides the camps, it has been said,6 is the question
of how to test for conflict. Should this be a capacity test or a capability7 test?
The focus of each is different. The capacity test asks whether the impugned
profit arose out of the director’s position as a director whilst the capability
test assesses the company’s ability to make (and also desire or interest in) that
particular profit. Allegations of breach of the no-conflict rule by directors often
involve a director’s unauthorised pursuit of a business opportunity. Where the
focus is how the director came by the opportunity (ie, the capacity test), it
is clearly irrelevant whether the company was itself capable of exploiting the
opportunity (ie, capability questions). As long as the link to the director’s
office can be established, the illicit profit must be surrendered. This approach,
lauded by its proponents for its deterrent effect and clarity of application,
has been criticised as being harsh and unrealistic.8 On the other hand, the
capability test is more flexible and fact-sensitive, demanding that account be
taken of factors that might demonstrate the company’s realistic ability to exploit
1 P. Birks, ‘The Content of Fiduciary Obligation’ (2000) 34 Isr Law Rev 3, 23.
2 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 18. For a recent consideration of the
no-conflict rule in the context of shadow directors, see S. Witney, ‘Duties Owed by Shadow
Directors: Closing in on the Puppet Masters?’ [2016] JBL 311.
3 Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44, 51 per Lord Herschell.
4 Aberdeen Railway v Blaikie Brothers [1854] 1 Macq 461, 471.
5 Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46, 124.
6 D. Ahern, ‘Guiding Principles for Directorial Conflicts of Interest: Re Allied Business and Financial
Consultants Ltd; O’Donnell v Shanahan’ (2011) 74 MLR 596.
7 See D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context – Text and Materials (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed, 2012) 524.
8 A. Berg, ‘Fiduciary Duties: A Director’s Duty to Disclose His Own Misconduct’ (2005) 121
LQR 213, 220.
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the opportunity. If this fact is not present, it cannot be said that there is a
‘real sensible possibility’ of conflict if a director pursues that opportunity for
himself.
The occasion for consideration of the issue arose before the Hong Kong
Court of Final Appeal in the case of Cheng Wai Tao v Poon Ka Man Jason9
(Cheng Wai Tao). Spigelman NPJ, who delivered the majority judgment, settled
the debate in Hong Kong law. His Honour applied the capability test, and held
that the boundaries of the no-conflict rule were delineated by the company’s
‘scope of business’.
FACTS
Ricky was an entrepreneurial chef who decided to start a chain of sushi restau-
rants in Hong Kong under the trade name ‘Itamae Sushi’ and associated marks
and logos that he designed and owned.10 He roped in his business partners (for
present purposes, the relevant individuals were siblings Jason and Daisy) with
whom he had been running a successful chain of Japanese noodle restaurants
(the ‘Ajisen business’). Each restaurant in the Ajisen business was operated by a
separate corporate entity in which Ricky and his partners held shares. As was
accepted both at trial and by the Court of Appeal,11 the business partners had,
pursuant to what was referred to as the ‘2004 Agreement’, decided to apply
this particular modus operandi to their proposed collaboration in the sushi
restaurant business. The company, Smart Wave, was incorporated to manage
and operate the first sushi restaurant under the banner Itamae Sushi, and Ricky
was appointed its sole director. However, the shares of Smart Wave were held
not only by Ricky, Jason and Daisy as some 28 per cent were issued to five
individuals who were either suppliers or employees of Smart Wave. This par-
ticular fact was of immense significance to the outcome of the case, as we shall
see.
The first restaurant was, in Jason’s words, a ‘huge success’,12 and in the
pithy words of the trial judge, ‘inevitably, success breeds dispute’.13 Indeed,
Ricky, who maintained throughout that he was entitled to, proceeded to open
more successful restaurants. Each of these restaurants was operated by a different
company in whichRicky was the sole shareholder. Jason and Daisy commenced
a derivative suit on behalf of Smart Wave against Ricky for breach of directors’
duties. At first instance, the High Court found that Smart Wave ‘was never
intended by its shareholders to have the exclusive right to carry on the sushi
restaurant business’ under the Itamae Sushi name,14 and held that Ricky could
not therefore be said to have acted in breach of his duties. The Court of Appeal
reversed the trial judge’s decision. In its view, the state of the evidence did
9 [2016] HKCFA 23.
10 This was initially disputed, but the High Court accepted that ‘Ricky’s evidence establishes a
prima facie case of his insistence on the ownership of the marks’: Fine Elite Group Ltd v Cheng
Wai Tao [2013] HKCFI 838 at [28].
11 n 9 above at [42].
12 ibid at [8].
13 n 10 above at [4].
14 ibid at [63].
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not support the judge’s conclusion that all the shareholders of Smart Wave had
agreed to limit the scope of Smart Wave’s business to a single sushi restaurant. It
will be recalled that the shareholders of Smart Wave included those five other
individuals who together held 28 per cent of the company. In the view of the
Court of Appeal, there was no affirmative evidence that these five minority
shareholders had consented or acquiesced to the reduction in the business
scope of the company. The Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal
granted leave to appeal on the basis of a question of ‘great, general and public
importance’,15 which was ‘[w]hether the “no-conflict rule” applies to a director
of a chain business where the agreed modus operandi was to have one company
for one agreed operation’.16 By a majority of three to two, the Hong Kong
Court of Final Appeal dismissed Ricky’s appeal. All five justices were agreed
that the success or otherwise of Ricky’s case depended on whether Smart Wave
was, as Ricky had asserted, a single or limited purpose company. The divided
conclusion was therefore not the result of a disagreement as to the law —
their Honours parted ways where it came to proof of that restriction. Whilst
the minority considered the primary facts found at first instance to support the
trial judge’s conclusion that Smart Wave was a limited purpose company, the
majority disagreed. In the circumstances, Ricky was found to be in breach of
the no-conflict rule.
APPLICATION OF THE CONFLICT AND PROFIT RULES
Counsel for Jason and Daisy had sought to persuade the court that the com-
pany’s scope of business was irrelevant to corporate opportunity cases on the
basis of the English Court of Appeal decision in Re Allied Business and
Financial Consultants Ltd; O’Donnell v Shanahan17 (O’Donnell). Rimer LJ had
considered it irrelevant whether the particular opportunity that was exploited
by the directors fell within or without the scope of the company’s business,
because the directors had obtained that information ‘in the course of acting
as directors of the company and the opportunity also came to them in such
course’.18 In arriving at this conclusion, his Lordship had distinguished the
old authority of Aas v Benham19 on the ground that that case concerned
‘the fiduciary duties owed by a partner whose duties were circumscribed by
the contract of partnership’.20 Aas v Benham was a decision that concerned
a partner who had, in setting up a separate business for which he received
profits, availed himself of information obtained whilst he was a partner of
the firm. The English Court of Appeal had applied a scope of business test
to exonerate the partner from any liability to account to the firm for his
profits.21
15 n 9 above at [64].
16 ibid.
17 [2009] 2 BCLC 666.
18 ibid at [54].
19 [1891] 2 Ch 244.
20 n 17 above at [68].
21 n 19 above, 255 per Lindley LJ.
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Counsel’s argument did not resonate with Spigelman NPJ who opined that
‘the reasoning in O’Donnell v Shanahan may go too far’.22 In his Honour’s
view, there was little if any reason for different tests to apply to partners and to
directors, both of which are well established categories of fiduciaries. Spigelman
NPJ thus concluded that a scope of business inquiry was relevant to directors.23
Indeed, Rimer LJ’s judgment has been at the same time criticised24 and
praised,25 depending on which camp the commentator belongs to. This di-
vergence may be traced to an unresolved and fundamental question on the
taxonomy26 of the no-conflict and no-profit rules, and that is whether these
rules are separate rules or whether there is only the one no-conflict rule.
Whilst English courts have at times accepted that the rules are separate,27
it is also not uncommon for the dividing line to be obliterated, and the rules
spoken of in terms only of the no-conflict rule, with the no-profit rule treated
merely as an aspect of the former.28 Indeed, section 175 of the Companies
Act 2006 reflects this latter perspective.29 But Rimer LJ did not, in O’Donnell,
conflate the rules. Instead, his Lordship patently dealt with them as separate
rules activated by different considerations. This recognition that the rules have
differing, albeit overlapping, spheres of operation is significant. Underpinning
it is the implicit acceptance that the rules are galvanised for different reasons
and in different situations. As Deane J explained in Chan v Zacharia,30 the
purpose of the no-conflict rule is to ‘preclude the fiduciary from being swayed
by considerations of personal interest’ whilst the objective of the no-profit rule
is to ‘preclude the fiduciary from actually misusing his position for his personal
advantage’. Maintaining a distinction between the rules may therefore permit a
better appreciation of the scope of the respective spheres, and the considerations
that are relevant for delineating each sphere.
These considerations are not necessarily co-extensive.When considering the
no-conflict rule, it is important to note that the ‘conflict’ refers to a conflict
between the director’s duty to the company and his personal interests, and not to
a conflict between the company’s interests and the director’s interests (although
note that section 175 of the Companies Act 2006 obliges a director to avoid
a situation involving unauthorised conflicts between his personal interests and
22 n 9 above at [85].
23 ibid at [87].
24 See, for example, E. Lim, ‘Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: A New Analytical Framework’ (2013)
129 LQR 242.
25 See, for example, Ahern, n 6 above.
26 ibid, 598.
27 See, for example, Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291, 341; Quarter Master (UK)
Ltd v Pyke [2005] 1 BCLC 245 at [55]; Wilkinson v West Coast Capital [2005] EWHC 3009
at [246]; Re Allied Business and Financial Consultants Ltd [2009] 2 BCLC 666. See also Chan v
Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178, 198 per Deane J of the High Court of Australia.
28 See, for example, Boardman n 5 above, 123; New Zealand Netherlands Society ‘Oranje’ Inc v Kuys
[1973] 1 WLR 1126, 1129 and, most recently, in FHR European Ventures LLP v Mankarious
[2014] UKSC 45 at [5], where Lord Neuberger also expressed the view that the no-profit rule
was part of ‘wider [no-conflict] rule’.
29 See B. Hannigan, Company Law (Oxford: OUP, 4th ed, 2016) at [12-2]; Kershaw, n 7 above,
574.
30 (1984) 154 CLR 178, 198.
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‘the interests of the company’). As Finn observed in his seminal work, Fiduciary
Obligations,
[t]rite though the point is, it must be made. A fiduciary’s liability for a profit stems
not from a conflict between his interests and his beneficiary’s interests, but from a
conflict between his own interests and the actual undertaking he has made (his duty)
to his beneficiary.31
It follows therefore, that before any question of breach of the no-conflict rule
may be considered, the precise scope and ambit of the director’s undertaking to
his company must first be ascertained. Lord Upjohn said as much in Boardman
v Phipps
Once it is established that there is such a [fiduciary] relationship, that relationship
must be examined to see what duties are thereby imposed upon the agent, to see
what is the scope and ambit of the duties charged upon him . . . Having defined
the scope of those duties one must see whether he has committed some breach
thereof and by placing himself within the scope and ambit of those duties in a
position where his duty and interest may possibly conflict. It is only at this stage
that any question of accountability arises.32
The duties owed by a director may be qualified, for example, in the company’s
constitution or by an agreement that binds all the shareholders and the
company,33 or the factual circumstances may be such as to reduce the scope
and extent of the duties owed.34 To this inquiry, the question of the company’s
scope of business is clearly relevant, for that would delineate the director’s ‘actual
undertaking’ and hence permit proper demarcation of the duty he owes.
On the other hand, the no-profit rule reproves the actual misuse or abuse of
position. In the inquiry into whether there is a breach of this rule, it is crucial to
examine whether the impugned profit arose ‘in the course and execution’ of the
fiduciary relationship.35 Thus, inRegal (Hastings) Ltd vGulliver,36 despite having
acted in good faith and despite the company being quite incapable of making
the impugned profit itself, the directors were held liable to account as the profits
had been made by reason and in the course of the fiduciary relationship. As
31 P. D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1977) at [540] (emphasis
added).
32 Boardman n 5 above, 127. Thus, in Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83, a company was not entitled to
the profit made by a director who had sold property he had acquired to the company without
disclosing that fact because there was no ‘evidence whatever of any commission or mandate to
[the director] to purchase on behalf of the company, or that he was in any sense a trustee for the
company of the purchased property’: ibid, 98.
33 See, for example, Wilkinson v West Coast Capital [2005] EWHC 3009, where the fact that the
company’s capacity to acquire a new interest was restricted in a shareholders agreement to which
the company was itself a party was held to constrain the company’s ‘interests’ such that a director
who acquired that new interest was held not to have breached the no-conflict rule.
34 See In Plus Group Ltd v Pyke [2002] 2 BCLC 201 and Foster v Bryant Surveying Ltd v Bryant [2007]
2 BCLC 717, where the directors in question had been excluded from effectively performing
their role as directors.
35 Parker v McKenna (1874) LR 10 Ch App 96, 118.
36 [1942] 1 All ER 378.
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Lord Russell of Killowen famously said, ‘[t]he liability arises from the mere fact
of a profit having, in the stated circumstances, been made’.37 This is a strictly
capacity-focused inquiry, on which the question of the company’s scope of
business can have no bearing.
With this bifurcation in the rules and the concomitant differentiation in the
focus of the applicable tests, it becomes clear that there should really be no
question of choosing between a strict capacity-focused approach for liability
or embracing flexibility by permitting reference to the peculiar circumstances
obtaining.38 Rather, one should ask which inquiry is the appropriate one to
make in the present circumstances.
In O’Donnell, Rimer LJ clearly intended to apply the strict capacity-focused
approach, but specifically to the no-profit rule. His Lordship stated
If an opportunity comes to [the director] in his capacity as a fiduciary, his principal
is entitled to know about it . . . The authorities relating to directors’ accountability
not only do not support the ‘scope of business’ exception in relation to the ‘no
profit’ rule, they are contrary to it.39
It should be noted that, on the facts of O’Donnell, Rimer LJ also found the
directors to have separately breached the no-conflict rule, but that that conflict
was present independently of the company’s scope of business.40 It was therefore
not Rimer LJ’s view that a scope of business inquiry was irrelevant to the issue
of breach of the no-conflict rule.41 Seen in context therefore, it would appear
that Spiegelman NPJ’s opprobrium ofO’Donnellmight have been, with respect,
somewhat misplaced.
It should be pointed out that Rimer LJ was not dealing with the statutory
restatement of the no-conflict and no-profit rules. Although section 170 of
the Companies Act 2006 provides explicitly for the statutory duties to be
interpreted and applied in the same way as the common law and equitable
rules on which they are based, it might require some inspired maneuvering
around the language employed in section 175 if this bifurcated approach is to
survive within the statutory framework. The position may well be different
in Hong Kong, where directors’ duties remain within the purview of the
common law. His disagreement with Rimer LJ notwithstanding, Spigelman
NPJ had clearly accepted, and it is submitted with respect rightly, that the no-
conflict and no-profit rules are separate rules, even as he recognised the overlap
between the two rules, and especially in business opportunity cases. Cheng Wai
Tao, as his Honour noted, had proceeded solely on the basis of the no-conflict
rule. In the circumstances, a conclusion that, under Hong Kong law, the scope
of business test is of no relevance to a consideration of the no-profit rule cannot
therefore be excluded.
37 ibid, 385.
38 cf, Ahern, n 6 above, 597; see also discussion in Kershaw, n 7 above, 518.
39 n 17 above at [55]-[56].
40 ibid at [74]-[75].
41 As Spigelman NPJ appeared to have suggested: n 9 above at [85].
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ESTABLISHING ‘SCOPE OF BUSINESS’
Spigelman NPJ noted
[A] ‘scope of business test’ may be applicable to a company. The facts and circum-
stances of a particular case may be such as to modify the subject matter to which the
fiduciary duties of a director apply.42
The modification in this case, as Ricky contended, was a limitation on the
company’s scope of business to a single restaurant. If this could be established,
it would confine Ricky’s undertaking to Smart Wave as its director to only that
single sushi restaurant owned by Smart Wave. Accordingly, Ricky’s establishing
and running of other sushi restaurants would not, on this premise, place him in
any position of conflict given the limited scope of his undertaking, and hence
duty, to the company. Establishing the restriction contended for was therefore
pivotal to the success of Ricky’s case. In this regard, Spigelman NPJ empha-
sised that the modification ‘must be binding in the corporate context’,43 and his
Honour accepted that the means by which this modification may be effected
may be formal, through, for example, a provision in the company’s constitu-
tion or a shareholders’ resolution, or informal, ‘as long as it is, in substance,
equivalent to a formal modification’.44 As the single-restaurant restriction was
not stipulated in the company’s constitution, nor was it the subject matter
of an appropriate shareholders resolution, Ricky had to rely on the unani-
mous consent rule attributed to Re Duomatic Ltd,45 which would accord to the
informal assent of all the shareholders the binding effect of a properly passed
general meeting resolution.
As already alluded to, it was at this point that the judges parted ways. Whilst
there was little dispute that Ricky, Jason and Daisy had agreed to the restricted
scope of the company’s operations, there was no independent evidence that
the remaining shareholders had. But the minority judges, like the trial judge,
were prepared to infer this from the factual circumstances, including the fact
that these other shareholders had been recruited by Ricky, and that it was
Ricky who had paid for the shares for all except one of these shareholders.46 In
contrast, Spiegelman NPJ felt unable to make the inference precisely because
of these facts. His Honour stated
In my opinion, the fact that these shareholders had such a close relationship with
Ricky, is a basis for drawing the opposite conclusion. First, [Ricky] did not call them
in support of the alleged ‘agreement’ or ‘understanding’. That is a foundation for
the usual inference that nothing they could say would support his case. Secondly, the
more probable inference is that they were reluctant to jeopardise that relationship
by complaining, let alone joining in hostile legal proceedings.47
42 ibid at [87] (emphasis added).
43 ibid.
44 ibid.
45 [1962] 2 Ch 365.
46 n 9 above at [29].
47 ibid at [124].
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Spigelman NPJ’s approach, with respect, is likely to be the correct one. Whilst
the cases show that the consent necessary for the Duomatic principle may be
inferred from a variety of factors,48 the fact remains that the principle requires
such consent to be objectively established.49 As Newey J said in Re Tulsense Ltd;
Rolfe v Rolfe:
[A] shareholder’s mere internal decision [cannot] of itself constitute assent for
Duomatic purposes . . . [F]or a mere internal decision, unaccompanied by outward
manifestation or acquiescence, to be enough would . . . give rise to unacceptable
uncertainty and, potentially, provide opportunities for abuse. . . . [T]here must be
material from which an observer could discern or (as in the case of acquiescence)
infer assent.50
Given the lack of any outward manifestation of assent on the part of those
remaining shareholders or any other objective material from which to infer
unqualified assent, it would seem, with respect, that the minority judges in
Cheng Wai Tao might have been overly generous in their application of the
unanimous consent rule.
At this juncture, it is of interest to juxtapose the Hong Kong court’s treatment
of the restriction on the scope of the company’s operations with the approach
taken by the English Court of Appeal in the difficult decision of Bhullar v
Bhullar.51 The well-known facts may be briefly stated. The company was set
up by two families to acquire properties for investment, with the company’s
shares split equally between the two sides. Unfortunately, the relations between
the two families broke down, and were at a ‘state of considerable acrimony’.52
At this stage, the claimant side of the family informed the defendant side that
they did not wish for the company to acquire further properties. The defendant
side, in the words of Jonathan Parker LJ, ‘accepted this decision in principle’.53
Subsequently, the defendants, who were directors on the company’s board,
chanced upon property adjacent to one of the company’s existing properties,
and acquired it for themselves.
Given the shareholders’ agreement not to acquire further properties, it could
be argued that the company’s scope of operations had been restricted by the
shareholders’ unanimous consent. It should then follow that the duties owed by
the defendant directors had been correspondingly qualified. The relevance of a
scope of business inquiry in this sense however carried little if any weight with
the court.54 Instead, the court appeared to have utilised the scope of business
inquiry to impose liability on the defendants. Accepting that it would have
been ‘worthwhile’55 for the company itself to purchase the property, which
meant that the opportunity to acquire it fell ‘plainly in the company’s line
48 EIC Services Ltd v Phipps [2004] 2 BCLC 589 at [122]
49 Schofield v Schofield [2011] 2 BCLC 319 at [32].
50 [2010] 2 BCLC 525 at [41].
51 [2003] 2 BCLC 241.
52 ibid at [10].
53 ibid.
54 Although there appeared to have some attempt to argue the point by counsel for the defendants,
see n 51 above at [20].
55 ibid at [15].
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of business’,56 the court agreed with the trial judge that the facts disclosed ‘a
real sensible possibility of conflict’.57 With respect, such an approach fails to
appreciate the true premise for the operation of the no-conflict rule. As pointed
out above, what the rule proscribes is a conflict between the director’s duty
to the company and his personal interests. Accordingly, whatever a company’s
extant business interests may be, the director’s undertaking or duty in respect
thereof may yet be circumscribed by the particular circumstances of the case,
including an agreement to restrict the scope of the company’s actual operations.
THE MASHONALAND PRINCIPLE
Counsel for Ricky had attempted to rely on London and Mashonaland Exploration
Co Ltd v New Mashonaland58 (Mashonaland) for the proposition that there was
‘no completely rigid rule that a director may not be involved in the business of
a company which is in competition with another company of which he was a
director’.59 Spigelman NPJ did not think that Mashonaland would do much to
advance Ricky’s case. Indeed, criticism (both judicial and academic) of Chitty
J’s ex tempore judgment has been sustained and well-rehearsed. His Honour
referred to a fuller report of the case that had appeared in The Times,60 which
he thought put Chitty J’s judgment in a ‘different light’.61 From this report,
it may be readily appreciated that the director in question, Lord Mayo, was a
desired name to have on the boards of the rival companies only, as Spigelman
NPJ put it, ‘to enhance the reputability of the investment [in the respective
companies]’.62 Lord Mayo had held no active role in the plaintiff company. As
a matter of fact, Chitty J had contrasted Lord Mayo’s position with that of a
director ‘in a position similar to that of a managing partner’ whomight therefore
‘stand in some such position to the company as would a confidential manager
to a private firm’.63 If one accepts that what the no-conflict rule proscribes is
a conflict between duty and personal interests, it would be obvious that the
occasion for Lord Mayo to be placed in a position of conflict would have been
remote at best given that he had ‘never acted as a director, nor attended any
board meeting’64 and, as Spigelman NPJ noted, ‘never would’.65
What then of Lord Blanesburgh’s approbation of Chitty J’s decision in Bell
v Lever Brothers Ltd?66 A closer look at the context of Lord Blanesburgh’s
comment discloses that his Lordship was referring to what he had termed
‘contracts of the second class’.67 By this, he meant contracts in which the
56 As counsel for the claimants argued, ibid at [24].
57 ibid at [42].
58 [1891] WN 165.
59 In Plus Group Ltd v Pyke [2002] 2 BCLC 201 at [72] per Brooke LJ; see also at [79] per Sedley LJ.
60 10 August 1891, 3.
61 n 9 above at [96].
62 ibid at [97].
63 The Times 10 August 1891, 3.
64 ibid.
65 n 9 above at [97].
66 [1932] AC 161, 194-195.
67 ibid, 195.
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company ‘has no interest at all’.68 To such contracts, the no-conflict rule, again
on the tighter view of ‘conflict’, does not apply. It appears therefore that Lord
Blanesburgh had considered Chitty’s J’s judgment as being relevant only to a
situation in which the no-conflict rule is inapplicable, and in such cases, the
director can only be made liable to account for his profit if ‘in earning that profit
he has made use either of the property of the company or of some confidential
information which has come to him as a director of the company’.69 And this,
as Spigelman NPJ observed, is simply ‘an orthodox reflection of the scope of
duty principle’.70 In the circumstances, Mashonaland should, quite rightly, be
‘regarded as standing for no wider a proposition than the trite statement that
the law will not interfere in the absence of evidence of a real possibility of
breach of fiduciary duty’.71
THE PROSCRIPTIVE-PRESCRIPTIVE DIVIDE
There is a final point. Spigelman NPJ stated that ‘[t]he duty of a director to
act in the best interests of the company is a statement of the positive duty of
loyalty which is broader than, but encompasses, the conflict rule’.72 Whilst his
Honour had no further need to discuss the duty of loyalty, the fact that he had
assuredly described the duty as a positive obligation is of note. The question
whether fiduciary duties impose positive or prescriptive duties has long been
a vexed one. In Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi,73 Arden LJ saw as part of
the fundamental duty of loyalty to which a director is subject, the prescriptive
duty to disclose his own misconduct to his principal.74 Arden LJ’s decision
engendered much debate as it was seen as contrary to the perceived orthodoxy
that fiduciary duties, imposed by equity, are proscriptive only.75 As Lord Woolf
famously said, ‘[equity] tells the fiduciary what he must not do. It does not
tell him what he ought to do’.76 But Lord Woolf attributed the source of this
truism to the important decision of the High Court of Australia in Breen v
Williams.77 There, Gummow J had stated in no uncertain terms that
[i]t would be to stand established principle on its head to reason that because
equity considers the defendant to be a fiduciary, therefore the defendant has a legal
68 ibid, 194.
69 ibid.
70 n 9 above at [92].
71 ibid at [104].
72 ibid at [72] (emphasis added).
73 [2005] 2 BCLC 91.
74 ibid at [41].
75 B. Hannigan, ‘Reconfiguring the No Conflict Rule – Judicial Strictures, a Statutory Restate-
ment and the Opportunistic Director’ (2011) 23 SALJ 714 at [13]. See further, M. Conaglen,
‘The Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty’ [2005] 121 LQR 452; cf R. Lee, ‘In Search
of the Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty: Some Observations on Conaglen’s Analysis’
(2007) 27 OJLS 327; R. Nolan, ‘Controlling Fiduciary Power’ [2009] CLJ 293. See also the
Explanatory Notes to the Companies Act 2006 (c 46) (UK) at para 298.
76 [1998] Ch 439, 455.
77 (1996) 186 CLR 71. See also P. J. Millett, ‘Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce’ (1998) 114
LQR 214, 222-223.
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obligation to act in the interests of the plaintiff so that failure to fulfil that positive
obligation represents a breach of fiduciary duty.78
Breen,79 however, was a case that concerned a patient who was seeking access
to her medical records from her doctor, and not a corporate director. This
potential point of distinction has, however, been dismissed judicially on the
ground that the statements in Breen were ‘cast in very general terms, and
not limited to the doctor-patient relationship’.80 Fassihi has therefore been
considered inconsistent with Australian law.81
It is however important to note that a doctor, quite unlike a director
or a trustee, does not occupy a fiduciary office. As Finn notes, the class of
fiduciary office holders, of which company directors and trustees are important
members, are distinguished from other fact-based fiduciaries in that ‘while they
are entrusted with discretions to be exercised for another’s benefit, they are not
subject to the immediate control and supervision of that other in their exer-
cise’.82 As a consequence, the fiduciary office holder is ‘positively required in
his decision making to act honestly in what he alone considers to be in the in-
terests of . . . his beneficiaries’.83 Finn is not alone in drawing this distinction –
Glover appears to do so too as he states that ‘[f]iduciary duties do not impose
positive obligations on fiduciaries who are not trustees’.84 The qualification is
critical, and yet so frequently ignored.85
The resulting confusion has led to attempts to reconcile these seemingly
contradictory positions by asserting that the duty of loyalty is not really a fidu-
ciary duty at all but rather imposes ‘a broad, general, aspirational statement’.86
But surely this accords insufficient respect to the duty that has been described as
‘the distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary’87 and which is a ‘time-honoured
rule’88 for directors. According to Professor Birks, it is the ‘the third degree of
altruism’89 which requires ‘not only positive action in the interest of another
but also disinterestedness’ that is that ‘very rare obligation . . . commonly called
the fiduciary obligation’.90 It is of interest to note that Owen J of the Supreme
Court of Western Australia took the view in Bell Group Limited (in liq) vWestpac
78 ibid, 138. See also, joint judgment of Gaudron and McHugh JJ, ibid, 113 and Pilmer v Duke
Group Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 165, 197.
79 See R. Nolan, ‘A Fiduciary Duty to Disclose?’ (1997) 113 LQR 220.
80 P & V Industries Pty Ltd v Porto (2006) 14 VR 1, 5.
81 ibid, 9.
82 Finn, n 31 above at [111].
83 Finn reiterates the point in P. D. Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T. G. Youdan (ed), Equity,
Fiduciaries and Trusts (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 1, 27.
84 J. Glover, Equity, Restitution and Fraud (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004) at [4.2] (emphasis
added).
85 Surprisingly, even by those who argue that prescriptive fiduciary obligations can exist: see R. Lee,
‘In Search of the Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty: Some Observations on Conaglen’s
Analysis’ (2007) 27 OJLS 327, 337 who cites (at n 47) Finn for his proposition that ‘no more
than loyalty is exacted’. Finn however explicitly qualifies his statement by excluding the class of
fiduciary office holders: see Finn, n 83 above, 28.
86 Hannigan, n 75 above at [16].
87 Bristol and West Building Society n 2 above, 18.
88 Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v Rank Organisation Ltd [1985] BCLC 11, 21.
89 Birks, n 1 above, 20.
90 ibid, 37.
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Banking Corporation (No 9)91 that the duty imposed upon directors to act bona
fide in the interest of the company was indeed fiduciary despite its essentially
prescriptive character.92 Perhaps to illustrate the unproductive nature of the
debate, Owen J flipped the bona fide duty rule around and re-couched it with
a proscriptive bent, in the same way that possibly every other positive rule can
be expressed negatively.93 It may be that the epithet ‘proscriptive’ simply and
literally means that equity does not prescribe what directors must do because,
as Lord Greene famously expressed, ‘they must exercise their discretion bona
fide in what they consider – not what a court may consider – to be in the
interests of the company’.94
CONCLUSION
Cheng Wai Tao helpfully provided an opportunity for the highest court in Hong
Kong to weigh in on the enduring debate about scope and classification in the
area of directors’ duties. It has been repeatedly affirmed that what defines the
fiduciary is the duty of loyalty to which he is subject. For the corporate di-
rector, this ‘first and greatest obligation’95 requires him to act positively in the
interests of the company. But, as Professor Birks observed, this duty to act in
another’s interests only becomes elevated to the status of a fiduciary duty when
it is bound with an obligation of ‘disinterestedness’,96 an obligation which
demands the denial of self-interest. However, the clearly proscriptive duty of
disinterestedness, manifested in the no-conflict and no-profit rules, is necessar-
ily ‘parasitic’97 on the primary obligation and is unworkable without it.98 The
fiduciary obligation is therefore a complex obligation – the prescriptive can-
not be fiduciary without the proscriptive, but the proscriptive is unintelligible
without the prescriptive. Perhaps what this tells us is simply that the debate
about classification is really quite unnecessary.
The application of the duty of disinterestedness, on the other hand, is a
different matter. The statutory statement of directors’ duties in the Companies
Act 2006 has placed the no-profit rule within the folds of the no-conflict
rule. This strongly suggests that in order for the no-profit rule to apply so
that liability to account is imposed on the director, there must first be a con-
flict (actual or possible) between the company’s and the director’s interests.99 It
has been observed that this is a ‘more balanced approach . . . and avoids the
risk . . . of fiduciaries being held accountable through the unreasonable and
inequitable application of equitable principles’.100 With respect, the inequity
91 (2009) 70 ACSR 1.
92 ibid at [4574]-[4577].
93 ibid at [4580].
94 Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304, 306.
95 Birks, n 1 above, 22.
96 ibid, 20.
97 ibid, 29
98 ibid.
99 Kershaw, n 7 above, 574; Hannigan, n 75 above at [43].
100 Hannigan, ibid.
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was the result of a view that saw ‘conflict’ as being defined by a generous
view of the company’s ‘interests’, when it should have been defined by ref-
erence to the director’s undertaking. On the other hand, the no-profit rule
had a much stricter requirement for application – the actual abuse of the
director’s position. Linking the rules as section 175 does, paradoxically re-
quires an expansive view of ‘conflict’ in order to capture situations of actual
abuse. It is submitted that this position is not conducive either to clarity or to
coherence.
954
C© 2017 The Author. The Modern Law Review C© 2017 The Modern Law Review Limited.
(2017) 80(5) MLR 927–954
